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JUDICIAL RELIEF FOR THE NEWSMAN'S
PLIGHT: A TIME FOR SECRECY?.
On February 4, 1970, Walter Cronkite, of the Columbia Broad-
casting System (CBS), bruskly stated: "We cannot function. Our people
cannot be informed if we have to work under these conditions."1 Frank
Reynolds, of the American Broadcasting Company (ABC), cogently set
forth the attendant argument: "We've got to make it very clear we're
not defending our right to broadcast but the people's right to know." 2
This was the response of the news media to a recent surge of federal
subpoenas issued to newsmen, in an attempt to coerce the disclosure of
secret information which they possessed.3 This recent plague of govern-
mental subpoenas was viewed by the news executives as "an increasing
effort by the authorities to collect intelligence about radical movements
from the news media."4
INTRODUCTION - A POLEMIC SITUATION
Newsmen have consistently relied upon confidential sources of
information as a means of obtaining newsworthy information.5 Tra-
ditionally, however, the journalists' use of "secret-informer" relation-
ships has not been legally protected. 6 Consequently, newsmen have been
subject to compulsory testimony as to the identity of their secret
sources, resulting in distrust and increased caution by informers. The
reason for this quandary is that the newsman-informer relationship,
unlike the attorney-client relationship, 7 is not deemed privileged.8
1 Statement by Walter Cronkite at the International Radio and Television Society in
New York on Feb. 4, 1970, as quoted in N.Y. Times, Feb. 5, 1970, at 26 col. 2.
2 Id.; see generally Note, The Listener's Right to Hear in Broadcasting, 22 STAN. L.
REv. 863 (1970).
3 Prior to these statements the Justice Department had subpoenaed the unedited files
and unused pictures of Time, Life and Newsweek magazines relating to the Weathermen
faction of Students for a Democratic Society (SDS). See N.Y. Times, Feb. 1, 1970, at 24,
col. 1. Another incident that has aroused much concern was the February subpoenaing of
New York Times correspondent Earl Cadwell. The government subpoena requested the
production of notes and tape recordings of interviews conducted with spokesmen of the
Black Panther Party. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 3, 1970, at 20, col. 1. In view of the importance
of the Cadwell incident, it will be viewed with increased detail in a subsequent section of
this paper.
4 N.Y. Times, Feb. 1, 1970, at 24, col. 1.
5 See Guest & Stanzler, The Constitutional Argument for Newsmen Concealing Their
Sources, 64 Nw. U.L. REv. 18, Appendix at 57 (1969); Note, The Right of a Newsman to
Refrain from Divulging the Sources of His Information, 36 VA. L. REV. 61, 75-82 (1950).
6 As stated in Rosenberg v. Carroll, 99 F. Supp. 629 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), "the prevailing
rule is that a newspaper correspondent must answer pertinent questions and disclose the
sources of his information that he has published or caused to be published if the questions
be relevant to the proceeding...."
7 See 7 TiE Woaxs oF JEpmry BENTIAm 473-79 (Bowring ed. 1842).
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Unsuccessful in their attempts to secure the cloak of privileged
communication, journalists have resorted to a constitutional first
amendment argument, under which the secrecy of their sources of
information is allegedly protected by the ubiquitous "freedom of the
press." Until recently however, this fact has failed to win judicial ap-
proval.9
The purpose of this note is to analyze the newsman's contended
first amendment right to conceal his confidential information and
sources of information 0 in light of his acknowledged obligation to
reveal his information for the promotion and fair administration of
justice.
HIsTolIcAL DEVELOPMENTS
The Evanescent Common-Law Argument
The tradition of journalists to withhold their sources was established
by John Peter Zenger.11 In attempting to follow his example newsmen
continued to argue for the application of a common-law privilege to con-
ceal their confidential sources of information 2 This argument for an ex-
ception to the established common-law rule of compulsory testimony3
is based upon (1) the public interest in the free flow of news, and (2) the
analogous privileged relationship of an attorney and his dient.14 How-
8 See 8 J. WiGMoRE, EvIDEwcE § 2286 (McNaughton rev. 1961). For a collection of cases
denying the privilege see Semeta, Journalist's Testimonial Privilege, 9 CE.v.-MaR. L. RE;V.
311, 315 (1960).
9 See Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958); State
v. Buchanan, 250 Ore. 244, 486 P.2d 729, cert. denied, 392 U.S. 905 (1968); In re Taylor,
412 Pa. 32, 193 A.2d 181 (1963); In re Goodfader's Appeal, 45 Hawaii 317, 367 P.2d 472
(1961). But see In re Caldwell, 311 F. Supp. 358 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
I0 The two related areas of concern intrinsic to the newsman's fight for constitutional
protection are: (1) the concealment of a newsman's source of information (i.e., the identity
of his informer), and (2) the concealment of actual information that a newsman possesses
but refuses to reveal (i.e., unpublished notes, tapes, records, photographs and film "take-
Outs").
11 JONES, FRaanot or THE PRESs 18-22 (1944).
12 Newsmen have also offered the argument that to reveal their sources would be a
violation of their professional code of ethics. The following was adopted as part of the
newsman's code of ethics by the American Newspaper Guild in 1934: "[N]ewspapermen
shall refuse to reveal confidence or disclose sources of confidential information in court
or before other judicial or investigating bodies .... " BmRD & MmiwIN, Tim NmsArER
AND Socirry 567 (1942), cited in Guest & Stanzler, supra note 5, at 29.
13 It is a basic premise of our judicial system that a witness properly summoned before
a tribunal must give his testimony unless a privilege or exemption can be shown. 8 J.
WIGmoRE, EVmENCE §§ 2190-92 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
14 Wigmore lists four conditions that have been recognized as essential to the estab-
ment of a privileged communication. They are:
(1) The communications must originate in a confidence that they will not be
disclosed.
(2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfactory
maintenance of the relation between the parties.
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ever, this claimed privilege has been repeatedly denied judicial recogni-
tion.15 Nevertheless, legislative response has been manifested by the
passage of protective legislation in sixteen states. 16
Non-recognition of a journalistic privilege has been based upon a
paramount public interest in the proper administration of the law.1 7
The leading case denying recognition is People ex rel. Mooney v. Sheriff
of New York County, 8 wherein a newspaper reporter had been sub-
poenaed before the New York County grand jury to answer questions
relating to a series of articles he had written concerning the "policy
racket." The reporter remained silent, contending that the source of
his information, which he obtained as a newspaper reporter, should be
considered confidential and privileged. This contention was rejected
by the court, and the reporter was adjudged guilty of contempt of court
for refusing to reveal names and addresses of persons and places men-
tioned in his articles. 19
A Return Bout - Via the Constitution
Undaunted, other reporters launched a new attack premised upon
a first amendment right authorizing concealment of news sources in or-
(3) The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community ought to be
sedulously fostered.
(4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the com-
munications must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the correct dis-
posal of litigation.
Id. § 2285.
'5 Confidential communication between a lawyer and his client for legal purposes was
the only professional privilege adopted at common law.
Id. §§ 2285-86.
16ALA. CODE R.FOMPnFE tit. 7, § 370 (1960); ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.25.150-.220 (Supp.
1970); AiZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2237 (Supp. 1970); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-917 (1964); CAL.
Evm. CODE ANN. § 1070 (West 1966); IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-1733 (1968); Ky. REv. STAT.
§ 421.100 (1969); LA. REv. STAT. §§ 45:1451-54 (Cum. Supp. 1968); MD. ANN. CODE art. 35,
§ 2 (1971); MicH. STAT. ANN. § 28.945(1) (1954); MONT. REV. CODEs ANN. tit. 93, ch. 601-2
(1964); NEv. REv. STAT. § 48.087 (1969); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-21-29 (Supp. 1971); N.Y.
Crv. RiGins LAw § 79-h (McKinney Supp. 1970); OHio, PEv. CODE ANN. § 2739.12 (1964);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 330 (Supp. 1970).
In Ex parte Sparrow, 14 F.R.D. 351 (D.C. Ala. 1953) the federal district court rejected
the argument that such a state privilege statute is unconstitutional under the fourteenth
amendment.
17 An inquiry of law enforcement officials in states that had newsman privilege statutes
indicated that the laws were acceptable and that the reporters did not impair the law
enforcement and prosecution of criminals. See 1949 N.Y. LAw REvsION COmm'N REP.
165-68. Nevertheless, New York rejected the proposal of a newsman's privilege statute in
1949.
Cases adopting the administration of the law concept are: People ex rel. Mooney v.
Sheriff of New York County, 269 N.Y. 291, 199 N.E. 415 (1936); In re Grunow, 84 N.J.L.
235, 85 At. 1011 (1913); Plunkett v. Hamilton, 136 Ga. 72, 70 S.E. 781 (1911). See also 8
J. WicmoR, Evm, cE 2192 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
I8 269 N.Y. 291, 199 N.E. 415 (1936). For a list of other cases rejecting such a privilege
see In re Goodfader's Appeal, 45 Hawaii 317, 332, 367 P.2d 472, 482 (1961).
19 The court refused to grant such a privilege, basing its decision on prior American
cases, and added that any extension should be implemented by the Legislature. See 269
N.Y. at 294-95, 199 N.E. at 415-16.
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der to assure the free flow of news to the public. 20 But, this attempt to
gain the protection of a constitutional recognition has also been
thwarted by the courts.21
Basic to this judicial denial of a first amendment right is the belief
that the essential rights granted by free speech and press are not abso-
lute.22 An accepted justification for infringement of the first amend-
ment is the public interest in preservation and protection of peace
and order23 as well as in the fair administration of justice.24
An early guide utilized by the Supreme Court for determining
whether expression is protected under the first amendment was the
"clear and present danger" rule.25 In essence, the rule provided that
"any attempt to restrict those liberties [of free speech and press] must
be justified by clear public interest, threatened not doubtfully or re-
motely, but by clear and present danger. '26
Subsequently, the Supreme Court devised and implemented a
balancing test, which provides that the determination of whether first
amendment protection is controlling depends upon a weighing of
conflicting interests by the court 27 In applying this test when con-
fronted with alleged violations of individual freedoms, the court will
evaluate competing individual and governmental interests.2 8
Prior cases concerning first amendment freedoms indicate the
liberal tendency of the Supreme Court in this area. The Court has
emphasized that the first amendment freedoms of speech and press are
to receive broad and preferred protection.29 Although not absolute,
restraints on the first amendment rights through the use of contempt
20 "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom ...of the press . ..
U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
21 The Supreme Court has denied certiorari to cases concerning this question and
thus far has not issued a formal ruling on the question. See Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d
545 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958); State v. Buchanan, 250 Ore. 244, 436 P.2d
729, cert. denied, 892 U.S. 905 (1968).
22 See, e.g., Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 US. 436 (1957); Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942); Whitney v. California, 274 US. 357 (1927).
23 United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 US. 75, 95 (1947).
24 Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 270 (1941).
25 In Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 831 (1946), the Court held that a contempt
punishment given to a newspaper for its criticism of a court is violative of the constitu-
tional guarantees of freedom of speech and press unless it can be shown that the utter-
ances complained of created a "dear and present danger" to the administration of justice.
26 Thomas v. Collins, 323 US. 516, 530 (1945).
27 See Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 US. 36 (1961) (both majority and
dissenting opinions) for an analysis of the balancing test and the unaccepted contention
of the absoluteness of the first amendment.
28 See Uphaus v. Wyman, 860 US. 72 (1959).
29 See, e.g., Associated Press v. United States, 826 U.S. 1, 20 (1945); Bridges v. Call-
fornia, 314 US. 252, 265 (1941). The intention of the framers of the Constitution was to
make the first amendment guarantees broader than those that ex-isted in England. See Z.
CuAFE, FRmzoar oF SPEEcH AN PRess 10, 41-45 (1955).
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citations,30 city nuisance ordinances, 31 and a state tax on newspapers3"
have been held unconstitutional. Justification for a broad interpreta-
tion of the first amendment is attributed to the necessity of free public
discussion of issue and of criticism and investigation of public bodies
as essential requirements for the maintenance of the American political
system and a free society.83
In conformity with the expanded application of the first amend-
ment rights is the Supreme Court decision in Lamont v. Postmaster
General.34 In that case, Post Office officials, acting under a federal
statute, created a system under which a local post office, upon the re-
ceipt of "communist political propaganda" to be finally delivered to a
specific addressee, would retain the item and send notice to the addres-
see. If he wished to obtain the item, the addressee would have to submit
a request to the post office. The Post Office contended that the only pur-
pose for the system was to prevent delivery of propaganda to persons
who did not wish to receive it. Consistent with this purpose, all subse-
quent requests were honored and a list of those persons desiring the
propaganda was not maintained. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court held
that the system was unconstitutional under the first amendment. In his
majority opinion, Justice Douglas reasoned that "[t]he addressee carries
an affirmative obligation which we do not think the Government may
impose on him. This requirement is almost certain to have a deterrent
effect .... ,35
The Supreme Court, in NAACP v. Alabama,36 took notice of the
negative effects which tend to result from forced disclosure require-
ments. The Court held that coerced disclosure of the members of the
NAACP in accordance with a state statute37 violated the members'
rights of freedom of speech and of assembly.
When analogized to the precarious situation facing the newsmen,
Lamont and NAACP v. Alabama present strong arguments for a bal-
ancing of the interests in favor of the newsmen to conceal his sources
30 Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946).
31 Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
32 Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 US. 233 (1936).
33 Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 389 (1967); wherein the Supreme Court, in analyz-
ing the beneficial attributes of the first amendment guarantees of freedom of speech and
the press, stated: "[TMhose guarantees are not for the benefit of the press so much as for
the benefit of all of us. A broadly defined freedom of the press assures the maintenance
of our political system and open society."
34381 U.S. 301 (1965).
said. at 307 (1965).
36 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
37 In this case, the disclosure was the result of a forced filing of a membership list
with the State Attorney General.
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of information. A logical justification for such a proposition lies in the
essential reasoning that the forced revelation of sources by newsmen
would deter informers from relaying newsworthy information. The
ensuing result is inhibition of "the free flow of news to the public in
violation of the first amendment." 38
The tenor of judicial refusal to grant the first amendment protec-
tion to newsmen was initiated in Garland v. Tore.9 This case was the
result of a civil action which Judy Garland had brought against CBS
for breach of contract and defamation of character. During pre-trial
discovery proceedings Marie Torre refused to answer questions relating
to the identity of a CBS executive whose alleged defamatory statements
appeared in Miss Torre's column in the New York Herald Tribune.
Miss Torre's failure to comply with a federal district court order to
reveal the name resulted in her citation for contempt of court.40 On
appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,41 by Justice
Stewart, sitting as the Circuit Justice, ruled that even if the newsman's
right to conceal his sources comes under the first amendment, it must
necessarily yield to the overriding "public interest in the fair adminis-
tration of justice."42 The court recognized the hypothesis that com-
pulsory disclosure of confidential sources of information may act as
"an abridgment of press freedom by imposing some limitations upon
the availability of news."'43 To justify its decision, the court reasoned
that the first amendment is not absolute and that judicial compulsion
of testimony is basic to the "fair administration of justice." Where the
identity of the source "went to the heart of the plaintiff's claim,"
Stewart wrote, ".... the Constitution conferred no right to refuse an
answer."44 Certiorari was denied by the Supreme Court, and Miss
Torre served her ten-day jail sentence.
In 1961, the Hawaii Supreme Court adopted the Torre rule In re
Goodfader's Appeal.45 Therein, information was sought by a public
88 Guest & Stanzler, supra note 5, at 34.
39 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958).
40 The district court sentenced the defendant to ten days in prison, but Miss Torre
was released pending determination of her appeal. See id. at 547 n.2.
41 Appellant based her refusal to testify on three grounds: (1) freedom of the press
should permit non-disclosure; (2) federal public policy should act to create the recognition
of a privileged communication; (3) the trial court should have utilized its discretion to
limit the scope of pre-trial discovery under Federal Rule 30. In view of the purpose of
this paper only the first argument will be considered. However, the subsequent result of
the court's decision was the rejection of all three arguments.
42 259 F.2d at 549.
43 Id. at 548.
44 Id. at 550.
45 45 Hawaii 317, 367 P.2d 472 (1961). For a fine commentary on this case see Com-
ment, 61 Mcii L. REv. 184 (1962).
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official who desired reinstatement as personnel director of the Civil
Service Commission of the City and County of Honolulu, alleging that
her ouster was arbitrary and illegal. The reporter attended the meeting
in which plaintiff was ousted from the Commission. He admitted that
his attendance was prompted by information which he had received
from a confidential source. For failing to obey a court order to identify
this source he was held in contempt. This case differs from Torre, in
that the information related to actions of public officials and there was
no finding that the information sought went to the heart of plaintiff's
complaint. Instead, the court concluded that the information requested
"could be considered likely enough to lead to the discovery of suffi-
ciently important admissible evidence" 46 for plaintiff's reinstatement
action to warrant the denial of the alleged privilege.
The presence of a state privilege statute for newsmen creates a
viable basis for non-disclosure of information apart from the first
amendment. Such was the situation in In re Taylor,47 where a judicial
interpretation of a state privilege statute was held to protect a news-
paper from producing documentary sources of information used in the
writing of newspaper articles. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court re-
jected the newspaper's first amendment claim, but interpreted the ex-
isting Pennsylvania statute4 8 to extend to documentary evidence as well
as sources of information.49
Annette Buchanan, a writer for the University of Oregon student
newspaper, promised seven alleged marijuana users that in exchange
for an interview with them for publication she would not reveal their
names. Her first amendment contention for refusing to divulge that
information before a grand jury investigation was rejected by the
Oregon Supreme Court,50 which affirmed the trial court's decision
finding Miss Buchanan guilty of contempt and subjecting her to a
three-hundred dollar fine.51
46 45 Hawaii at 338, 367 P.2d at 484-85.
47412 Pa. 32, 193 A.2d 181 (1963).
48 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 28 § 330 (1958).
49 With reference to civil actions (normally actions for defamation) courts have ex-
hibited a tendency to strictly construe such privilege statutes. For a narrow construction
of state privilege statutes see Cepeda v. Cohane, 233 F. Supp. 465 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Brogan
v. Passaic Daily News, 22 N.J. 139, 123 A.2d 473 (1956); State v. Donovan, 129 N.J.L. 478,
30 A.2d 421 (1943).
50 State v. Buchanan, 250 Ore. 244, 436 P.2d 729 (1968). Although avoiding an elaborate
discussion of the problem, the court noted the possibility that such a first amendment
claim of the freedom of press may be in conflict with the equal protection and equal priv-
ilege rights present in the Constitution. For an excellent commentary on this case see
Recent Case, 82 HARV. L. Rlv. 1384 (1969).
51 N.Y. Times, June 29, 1966, at 23, col. 1, for a criticism of the lower court decision.
[Vol. 45:484
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More recently, an order was issued by a federal district court52
forcing a newsman to reveal the confidential source of his information,
the identity of which was found to be of sufficient importance in a
pending defamation suit. In denying the constitutional argument based
upon freedom of the press, the court relied heavily on the Torre deci-
sion; it justified impairment of freedom of the press by stating that the
information sought was of "sufficient relevance or materiality"53 to the
related defamation cases.
Tim REsuRRECToN OF AN ARGUMENT
The Newsman's Despair
The widespread publicity surrounding the subpoenaing of news-
men and news sources" has revitalized the constitutionally premised
first amendment argument. A series of major subpoenas 5 have been
issued,"6 commencing in January with the subpoenaing of CBS's tapes
and outtakes, i.e., unused film, pertaining to a television program deal-
ing with the Black Panthers.57 In addition, the federal government
subpoenaed the unedited files and unused photographs of Time, Life
and Newsweek magazines, which dealt with reports about the Weather-
man faction of Students for Democratic Society.58 And then a subpoena
was served upon New York Times correspondent Earl Caldwell, re-
52 Adams v. Associated Press, 46 F.R.D. 439 (S.D. Tex. 1969).
53 The person whose identity was sought allegedly said that the son of a high city
official and the daughter of an elected county official used marijuana and drugs.
54 Of minor importance, was the subpoenaing by the Antitrust Division of the Justice
Department of confidential information concerning a Fortune magazine interview with
James J. Ling, head of the Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc. conglomerate. The effect of this
particular subpoena was negligible since Ling volunteered to reveal the desired informa-
tion to the Justice Department. N.Y. Times, Feb. 10, 1970, at 24, col. 3.
55 Such subpoenas have been ominously referred to as "dragnet subpoenas." Elmer
Lower, President of ABC News, described them as demanding "a newsman . .. testify
and bring into court with him not only that which he printed or aired, but also those
portions of his research or filming which did not see public exposure." From a speech
at Loyola University (New Orleans) to the National Institute for Religious Communica-
tions, as quoted in N.Y. Times, June 6, 1970, at 20, col. 3.
56 The Senate Internal Security Subcommittee was barred from obtaining a subpoena
for the book records of the Liberation News Service and the Students for a Democratic
Society. Judge Mansfield of the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York issued a temporary restraining order prohibiting the Chemical Bank from
issuing the records to the subcommittee. N.Y. Times, Feb. 21, 1970, at 27, col. 2.
57 N.Y. Times, Jan. 26, 1970, at 1, col. 1. The reason given for the issuance of this
subpoena was the Government's allegation that Panther, David Hilliard had threatened
the life of President Nixon during a Nov. 15, 1969 speech. Upon consideration of the
purported Government reasons for desiring the requested information, CBS agreed to
cooperate with the government officials. N.Y. Times, Jan. 27, 1970, at 87, col. 1.
58 N.Y. Times, Feb. 1, 1970, at 24, col. 1. In response to media protestations, the
Justice Department eased its demands by dropping its request for the identity of the
confidential informants concerning the Weathermen. N.Y. Times, Feb. 5, 1970, at 1, col. 5.
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questing him to produce notes and tape recordings of interviews with
officers and spokesmen of the Black Panther party. 9
A consequence of these incidents has been the strong opposition
and criticism voiced by the major news media organizations, 60 a result
of which has been the promulgation of a new argument. This argument
can be succinctly stated as follows: Government coercion metamor-
phically transforms the newsman from employee for a news service,
seeking relevant, newsworthy information to be channeled to the gen-
eral public - to government agent, supplying the non-published fruits
of his research and inquiries.6
One can easily imagine the concern that this wave of subpoenas
engendered among the news media. 62 In response to service upon him,
New York Times corespondent Earl Caldwell steadfastly refused to
succumb to the "government inquisition" and moved in a federal dis-
trict court to quash the subpoenas that were issued against him.6 3 The
district court ruled" that Caldwell must appear before the grand jury,
but issued a protective order limiting the interrogation of him.65 While
refusing to quash the subpoena, the court in effect negated its force by
inserting the stipulation that Caldwell would not have to disclose any
confidential information which would
[i]mpinge upon the effective exercise of his First Amendment right
to gather news for dissemination to the public through the press
or other recognized media until such time as a compelling and
overriding national interest which cannot be alternatively served
has been established to the satisfaction of the court.66
59 N.Y. Times, Feb. 3, 1970, at 20, col. 1. Caldwell, a black reporter, was transferred
to the San Francisco headquarters of the New York Times and assigned to cover and
report upon Black Panther activities.
60 The president of CBS, Dr. Frank Stanton, expressed his concern over this sensitive
issue by stating that the existence of a broad unrestricted subpoena power over un-
published materials "can have a direct and seriously adverse effect on the free flow of
information, and access to news sources." Quoted in N.Y. Times, Feb. 4, 1970, at 21,
col. 1.
611d. at 21, col. 1, 2.
62 Id. at 21, col. 2, reporting that twenty-three reporters for the Wall Street Journal
signed a petition stating: "The subpoenas are a dangerous devise which could be used to
make us betray virtually any source in the future. We urge the entire profession to join
us in defending press freedom against this destructive practice."
63 Two subpoenas were issued against Caldwell. The first, issued Feb. 2, 1970,
requested Caldwell to present before a federal grand jury investigation of the Black
Panthers, tapes and notes of interviews with Black Panther leaders. The second, issued
Mar. 16, 1970, was issued to compel Caldwell to personally testify before the grand jury.
N.Y. Times, Mar. 17, 1970, at 30, col. 3. The New York Times joined with Caldwell in
his action to challenge the subpoenas.
64In re Caldwell, 311 F. Supp. 858 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
65 Prior to the district court's decision on the motion, the Justice Department




Denial of a carte blanche rejection of the subpoena was based upon the
ground that every person within the jurisdiction of the Government has
an obligation to give testimony before a grand jury.67
Although the district court decision appeared to be a victory for
Caldwell,6 he nevertheless remained displeased with the necessity of
his appearance before the grand jury.69 He refused to appear,70 for
which he was found to be in contempt of court.71
The dispute between Caldwell and the Justice Department re-
sulted in a ruling by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit to vacate the district court contempt judgment and order which
required Caldwell to appear before the grand jury.72 Circuit Judge
Charles M. Merrill stated that "where it has been shown that the
public's First Amendment right to be informed would be jeopardized
by requiring a journalist to submit to secret grand jury interrogation,
the Government must respond by demonstrating a compelling need
for the witness's presence before judicial process properly can issue to
require attendance." 73 The court in effect stated that the Government
must show a pressing need for the evidence before it can order a
journalist to testify before a secret grand jury investigation.
The court explicitly limited its holding to the Caldwell case. Judge
Merrill conceded the court's inability to establish a blanket rule and
expressed the view that each case must be determined according to its
own facts.74
The ratio decidendi of this decision is based on judicial recogni-
tion of the special circumstances attendant in Caldwell's case. A factor
67 Id. citing Blair v. United States, 250 US. 273 (1919).
68 In commenting upon the district court order, Caldwell's attorney, Anthony G.
Amsterdam, a law professor at Stanford University, stated that "[w]hat the court has done
by this ruling is to protect any and all confidential disclosures that members of the Black
Panthers may have made to Earl Caldwell." N.Y. Times, Apr. 4, 1970, at 1, col. 3, 4.
69 Caldwell's appeal of the district court's order to appear before the federal grand
jury was dismissed without comment by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit. N.Y. Times, Apr. 14, 1970, at 37, col. 1.
70 Caldwell was served with another subpoena on May 22, 1970 to appear before the
grand jury on June 3, 1970 relating to an investigation of the Black Panther Party. This
subpoena was identical to that which he was previously ordered to comply with and the
same restrictive order was also applicable. N.Y. Times, fay 28, 1970, at 35, col. 1. On June
4, 1970 Caldwell was ordered to show cause why he should not be held in contempt of
court for refusing to appear before a federal grand jury. N.Y. Times, June 5, 1970, at 70,
col. 7.
71 Caldwell was finally found guilty of civil contempt by Judge Zirpoli (the federal
judge who decided Caldwell's original motion to quash the government subpoena) for
his refusal to testify before the grand jury. But, he was allowed to remain free pending
the appeal of his contempt order. N.Y. Times, June 6, 1970, at 20, col. 2.
72 Caldwell v. United States, 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970).
73 Id. at 1089.
74Id. at 1089-90.
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of prime concern was the suspicious manner in which the Black Panther
party had viewed the press, labelling it as a vehicle for the "establish-
ment.' " The unique trust and rapport that Earl Caldwell had estab-
lished with the Panthers would be vitiated should he be compelled to
appear before a grand jury investigation of their activities. 6 Such a
consequence was viewed as an impairment of a journalist's abilities to
obtain newsworthy information to be disseminated among the public.7 7
Importantly, the court accepted the newsman's "government-
agent" argument. Governmental use of the fruits of a journalist's efforts
as a news gatherer was viewed as an abuse of power. In conclusion, the
court viewed the autonomy of the news media as endemic to the con-
cept of "freedom of the press." 78 Such autonomy entitles the news
media to enjoy the benefits of their investigative pursuits without fear
of governmental intervention.
The Issuance of Guidelines
In response to the strong criticism of the Justice Department's
subpoenaing practices, Attorney General John N. Mitchell issued
Guidelines to the Department of Justice for the issuance of subpoenas
to the news media, 79 the effect of which is to limit the discretion of
Government attorneys in subpoenaing newsmen.80 This result is at-
tained through the restrictive stipulations set forth in the Guidelines.81
75 The Court of Appeals relied upon affidavits of other newsmen which were sub-
mitted in order to substantiate the "chilling effect" upon first amendment rights, alleged
to be a result of the issuance of government subpoenas. Id. at 1084, 1087-88.
76 The use of secret and coerced testimony of newsmen presents additional onerous
burdens upon a black reporter. Such government coercion results in a deterioration of
the reporter's relationship with the black community and his ability to abstract news-
worthy information from the community. N.Y. Times, Feb. 4, 1970, at 21, col. 2.
77 A possible area of future concern is the collateral area involving the subpoenaing
of television and movie script writers as well as the authors of books. Whether the
function performed by such people will be viewed in the same light as that of newsmen
is doubtful. Nevertheless, they do perform an analogous service of informing the public
of social conditions and corruption, with the entertainment media as the mode of
communicating their message.
78 Amici curiae briefs were submitted by the news media (The Washington Post,
Newsweek, and The New York Times) in support of Caldwell's position. Caldwell v.
United States, 434 F.2d at 1082-83.
79 N.Y. Times, Aug. 11, 1970, at 24, col. 1.
5OAttorney General Mitchell claims that the Justice Department has successfully
negotiated with the news organizations to obtain important information without the
use of subpoenas. Special reference was made to the aid that had been given by the news
media with respect to the antiriot cases. N.Y. Times, Aug. 11, 1970, at 24, col. 1, 2.
81 Mitchell's Guidelines are as follows:
First: The Department of Justice recognizes that compulsory process in some
circumstances may have a limiting effect on the exercise of First Amendment
rights. In determining whether to request issuance of a subpoena to the press,
the approach in ever), case must be to weigh the limiting effect against the public
interest to be served in the fair administration of justice.
Second: The Department of Justice does not consider the press "an investigative
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Concisely stated, the Guidelines require that the Justice Department
attorneys must obtain the Attorney General's permission before sub-
poenaing a newsman. Before requesting subpoenas, efforts must first
be made to otherwise obtain the information. If this is unsuccessful,
negotiations must be initiated to convince the reporter to provide the
information voluntarily.
Apparent reasons for the issuance of the guidelines are appease-
ment of newsmen and avoidance of a major legal confrontation which
might result in judicially imposed limitations to the Government's
subpoena power.8 2 In view of the fact that the Guidelines were issued
arm of the Government." Therefore, all reasonable attempts should be made
to obtain information from nonpress sources before there is any consideration
of subpoenaing the press.
Third: It is the policy of the department to insist that negotiations with the
press be attempted in all cases in which a subpoena is contemplated. These
negotiations should attempt to accommodate the interests of the grand jury with
the interests of the news media. In these negotiations, where the nature of the
investigation permits, the Government should make clear what its needs are in a
particular case as well as its willingness to respond to particular problems of the
news media.
Fourth: If negotiations fail, no Justice Department ofidal should request, or
make any arrangements for, a subpoena to the press without the express
authorization of the Attorney General. If a subpoena is obtained under such
circumstances without this authorization, the department will- as a matter of
course-move to quash the subpoena without prejudice to its rights subse-
quently to request the subpoena upon the proper authorization.
Fifth: In requesting the Attorney General's authorization for a subpoena, the
following principles will apply:
A. There should be sufficient reason to believe that a crime has occurred,
from disclosures by nonpress sources. The department does not approve of
utilizing the press as a springboard for investigations.
B. There should be sufficient reason to believe that the information sought
is essential to a successful investigation- particularly with reference to directly
establishing guilt or innocence. The subpoena should not be used to obtain
peripheral, nonessential or speculative information.
C. The Government should have unsuccessfully attempted to obtain the
information from alternative nonpress sources.
D. Authorization for requests for subpoenas should normally be limited
to the verification of published information and to such surrounding circum-
stances as relate to the accuracy of the published information.
E. Great caution should be observed in requesting subpoena authorization
by the Attorney General for unpublished information, or where an orthodox




These are general rules designed to cover the great majority of cases. It
must always be remembered that emergencies and other unusual situations
may develop where a subpoena request to the Attorney General may be sub-
mitted which does not exactly conform to these guidelines.
Id. at col. 1, 2, 3.
82 Attorney General Mitchell requested that the American Bar Association conduct
a major study of the controversy. He specifically suggested that the A.B.A. formulate a
conclusion as to whether the newsmen's contention, that their ability to obtain the news
would be vitiated if they were forced to testify against their informants, should outweigh
the Government's need for evidence. N.Y. Times, Aug. 11, 1970, at 1, col. 6. However, a
privilege from disclosure is recognized for the concealment of the identity of government
informers. See McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967); Roviaro v. United States, 353 Us.
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subsequent to the district court decision in Caldwell, one can safely




Although the Guidelines have been viewed as "a constructive step
toward narrowing the field of potential conflict,"'8 4 they do not satisfy
the demands of newsmen. 85 First, their issuance implicitly asserts the
Government's right to subpoena in order to obtain unpublished infor-
mation which was received in confidence.8 6 Second, a subpoena may be
issued which transcends the Guidelines. Third, the Attorney General,
is not permanently bound by his guidelines. Fourth, the boundaries
established by the Guidelines are vague, e.g., the Guidelines state that
the Government must first reasonably attempt to obtain the informa-
tion from nonpress sources, but fail to define "reasonable attempt".
Fifth, and perhaps most importantly, the Guidelines are pervasively
subjective.
Aftermath of Caldwell- A Change of Balance
Although of limited immediate effect, Caldwell conceptually rep-
resents a definite shift in judicial attitude. The initial impression
projected by Caldwell is its impregnation upon the bastion of coerced
testimony.8 7 But of greater importance is the implicit shift of balance
that is manifested in the decision.
The courts in Torre and in those decisions adopting its position
have viewed the need for the information sought to be disclosed in
order to promote the fair administration of justice as outweighing the
possible limitation on the exercise of first amendment rights, i.e.,
abridgment of the free flow of news to the public18 Caldwell is an ex-
ception to this line of reasoning, for it required the Government to
53 (1957); Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251 (1938); see also 8 J. WiGMoRE, EvnrwcE
§ 2374(f) (McNaughton rev. 1961).
83 The subsequent Caldwell court of appeals decision also acts to limit the use of
government subpoenas; but the final decision as to whether the prerequisites were met
lies with the court and not with the Attorney General.
84 N.Y. Times, Aug. 12, 1970, at 40, col. 2 (editorial).
85 For a politically oriented criticism see N.Y. Times, Aug. 12, 1970, at 28, col. 7.
86The Government's refusal to completely surrender its subpoena power is sup-
ported by its claim that "secrecy can cloak irresponsible journalism and that the public's
right to effective law enforcement should come first." N.Y. Times, Feb. 5, 1970, at 26,
col. 7.
87 See note 13 supra.
88 See notes 39-53 and accompanying text supra.
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show (1) a compelling need for the information requested, and (2)
the unavailability of the information elsewhere. These prerequisites
must be satisfied before the court will require a limitation of first
amendment rights. These additional requirements provide a shift of
balance in favor of the newsmen, the result of which is the establish-
ment of a test of national compelling interest plus inaccessibility.
At this juncture a caveat must be interposed: Caldwell and the
Guidelines9 only apply to criminal cases and investigations involving
the Government. However, present conditions do not preclude even-
tual extension of this protection to civil cases9° where substantial rea-
sons for the protection can be shown.91
A potent argument for judicial extension of a newsman's protec-
tion to civil actions92 can be derived from Time, Inc. v. Hill03 Therein,
Life magazine published an article concerning a recent play entitled
the The Desperate Hours. The article deliberately related the play to
the actual experience of members of the Hill family, who were held as
hostages in their home by three escaped convicts. Certain offensive
scenes in the play did not actually occur to the Hill family. Hill sued
the magazine company for invasion of privacy under a New York
statute which provided a cause of action to a person whose name or
picture is used by another without consent for purposes of trade or
advertising. The Court set the standard by applying the rule that in
order for a publisher to be held liable for false reports of newsworthy
matters the plaintiff must prove that the publisher knew of their falsity
or acted in a reckless disregard of the truth. The Court stated that
misstatements of matters of public interest that are innocently or
negligently made are protected by the first amendment.
The conclusion derivable from Hill is that the danger to the free
flow of the news generally outweighs the right to recovery for injury
89 See note 81 supra.
90 On August 13, 1970 a bill was introduced in the House of Representatives, H.R.
18,983, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970) (The Newsmen's Privilege Act of 1970). The bill, in
addition to providing for Government actions and investigations, also pertains to civil
actions. It proposes that a newsman not be required to reveal his sources in civil actions
unless it can be shown that a "substantial injustice" would be incurred by the other party
if the source remained undisclosed. The bill applies to a newsman's source of informa-
tion as well as the information. The bill is under consideration by the Judiciary Commit-
tee. In view of the fact that similar bills have never been reported out of committee, it
does not seem likely that this bill will be so reported. See S. 1851, 88th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1963); H.R. 8519, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963); H.R. 7787, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963).
91 See the necessary requirements proposed in Caldwell v. United States, 434 F.2d
1081 (9th Cir. 1970).
92 However, such a protection would not exonerate newspapers from libel actions
imposed against them. See 1 Z. C A 'r, GovERNNT An MASS CoAmMuCAToNs 77-130
(1947).
93 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
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to one's reputation. In acknowledging the importance of the freedom
of the press the Court noted that:
We create a grave risk of serious impairment of the indispensable
service of a free press in a free society if we saddle the press with
the impossible burden of verifying to a certainty the facts associ-
ated in news articles with a person's name, picture or portrait, par-
ticularly as related to nondefamatory matter.94
Analogy can be made to a situation in which a litigant in a civil action
desires confidential information possessed by a newsman. Assuming
that revelation of such information would impede the free flow of the
news to the public, the newsman should be constitutionally protected
from forced disclosure.95
CONCLUSION
Although the first amendment is not absolute, the need for some
protection of a newsman's sources of confidential information is ob-
vious. As recognized by the Supreme Court, the purposes of the first
amendment include presentation of issues, investigation of public
bodies and presentation of news to the public.96 The function of the
news media is to perform a public service by informing the public of
newsworthy events.
Society is confronted with the increasing presence of radical and
insurgent elements. Since law enforcement officials are handicapped in
establishing a basis of communication and rapport with these elements,
we must look to another group for the accomplishment of this goal.
The newsman can perform this function. By establishing a relationship
of trust and confidence with radicals, newsmen are able to report rele-
vant newsworthy information to the public. Concededly, this situation
is at best tenuous. Although the coercion of testimony has been justified
by the necessary interests in the fair administration of justice, it seems
plausible that such governmental coercion may handicap the enforce-
ment of justice. This would be a logical result should newsmen be
forced to breach the quasi-fiduciary relationship that exists between
them and their informants and estranged radical groups existent in
society.
The test offered by the Ninth Circuit in Caldwell - national
compelling interest plus inaccessibility - appears to be a salutory one.
94 385 U.S. at 389.
95 See Guest & Stanzler, supra note 5, at 35-36.
96 See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388, 406-07 (1966); New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266-73 (1964), for cases supporting this statement.
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This test provides an acceptable form of protection for newsmen while
at the same time serving the needs of justice when the situation neces-
sitates disclosure. Caldwell is a vehicle for persuasion that should be
adopted by other jurisdictions. A national standard must be established
by the Supreme Court to resolve current non-uniformity in this area.
Moreover, in the area of civil law newsmen should also have the
right of a non-disclosure, unless substantial injury (to be determined
by the judge) would result therefrom.
